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I have to set up the most difficult ideal of the philosopher.  Learning is not enough!  The scholar is 
the herd animal in the realm of knowledge – who inquires because he is ordered to and because 
others have done so before him.  (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 226) 
 
Among the many qualities for which John Codd will be remembered, one of particular 
note for me was his intellectual integrity.  For John, there was no separation between 
the ideas he espoused and the way he lived his life.  I knew John for almost two 
decades.  As editor of the journal Delta in the late 1980s, he was responsible for the 
publication of one of my first academic articles and provided strong support and 
encouragement for my initial writing efforts.  In my discussions with John at 
conferences and other events, he was always humble, attentive and generous with his 
time.  In the work he published and presented John was lucid, rigorous and passionate 
in his pursuit of deeper truths.  He knew his fields of study well and managed, as few 
 2 
others can, to balance patience and thoughtfulness with uncompromising critique.  In 
his service as the external examiner for an EdD cohort at the University of Auckland 
in the early 2000s, John was thorough, fair and helpful in his comments for students 
and staff.  John was committed to democracy and social justice and exemplified those 
ideals in all areas of his academic life. 
 For these reasons and others, I regarded John as a model scholar.  At first glance, 
then, the quotation from Friedrich Nietzsche at the head of this paper might seem 
somewhat out of place.  Nietzsche’s words were recorded in his unpublished 
notebooks in 1884 and speak to our current age in a manner that is at once offensive 
and insightful.  For those committed to the ideal of the scholar as a creative, critical 
and not merely ‘learned’ being, Nietzsche’s portrayal of scholarly life might be 
regarded as irritating at best and repugnant at worst.  Yet there is a sense in which ‘we 
scholars’ (to use the phrase Nietzsche employs in the sixth part of Beyond Good and 
Evil: Nietzsche, 1990) are increasingly being encouraged – sometimes against our 
expressed wishes, and perhaps in ways we cannot fully understand as participants in 
the process – to become more ‘herd like’ in our activities as a condition of our 
continuing existence.  The ‘we’ in this context refers to a particular form of scholarly 
community, namely, the group of workers employed as academics in the 
conglomerate of institutions and organisations known collectively as ‘the university’.  
If by ‘continuing existence’ we mean ongoing paid employment in contemporary 
universities, a certain kind of herd-like behaviour has become almost a necessity. 
 This paper develops this idea in relation to research policy in particular, taking 
New Zealand’s Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) as an example.  In so 
doing, it builds on a tradition of critical scholarship to which John Codd made a very 
significant contribution.  John was at home in several domains of educational inquiry 
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– including philosophy of education, sociology of education, and educational policy 
studies – and a key focus of his later policy work was tertiary education and the PBRF 
(see, for example, Codd, 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b).  Indeed, I feel 
very fortunate to have co-authored a piece on tertiary education with John shortly 
before his untimely death (Roberts and Codd, 2010).  Our focus was the pervasive 
influence of neoliberalism in shaping tertiary education policy in New Zealand.  The 
legacy of neoliberal thought is still clearly evident in the PBRF, as the present paper 
attempts to show. 
 Drawing on the work of Nietzsche, I argue that the PBRF, while fostering an 
individualistic and competitive ethos within and between institutions, is also deeply 
conservative in its effects.  There are, it will be suggested, strong incentives in the 
PBRF scheme for scholars to become, in some respects, more ‘herd-like’ in their 
research activities.  The PBRF, in short, promotes a form of scholarly individualism 
that is ultimately conformist in its character and consequences.  The paper falls into 
three main parts.  The first section outlines Nietzsche’s distinction between scholars 
and philosophers and comments briefly on his own philosophical life.  The second 
part provides an account of the evolution and operation of performance-based 
research funding in New Zealand.  The final section evaluates the PBRF in the light of 
Nietzsche’s ideas. 
 
Nietzsche on scholars and philosophers 
 
Nietzsche’s views on scholars and philosophers were given expression in a number of 
his publications, including his essay ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (Nietzsche, 1997) 
and his book Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche, 1990).  Written as one in a series of 
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‘untimely meditations’, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ examines the relationship 
between the state, the university and philosophy, and describes – in typically 
Nietzschean witty detail – the defining features of the scholar.  These can be 
summarised as follows: probity and a sense for simplicity; sharpsightedness for that 
which is close, and myopia for that which is distant and universal; sobriety and 
conventionality in likes and dislikes; poverty of feeling and aridity; low self-esteem, 
amounting to modesty; loyalty towards one’s teachers and leaders; a preference for 
habit and routine; a tendency to escape boredom with the aid of books; a motive of 
‘breadwinning’; a desire for recognition by one’s fellow scholars; a propensity (rare 
among most) to vanity; amusement with scientific puzzles; and (occasionally) the 
impulse for justice (Nietzsche, 1997, pp. 161-177). 
The genuine philosopher, on the other hand, lives ‘unphilosophically’, ‘unwisely’ 
and imprudently.  The philosopher, Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and Evil, ‘risks 
himself constantly, he plays the dangerous game’ (Nietzsche, 1990, p. 132).  
Philosophers will confess to ‘taking pleasure in negating and dissecting and to a 
certain self-possessed cruelty which knows how to wield the knife with certainty and 
deftness even when the heart bleeds’ (p. 141).  These ‘hard’ characters, as Nietzsche 
describes them, will feel disgust in the face of ‘fawning enthusiasm, idealism, 
feminism, hermaphroditism’, instead exemplifying ‘[c]ritical discipline and every 
habit conducive to cleanliness and severity in things of the spirit’ (p. 141). 
Nietzsche laments the sickness – paralysis – of will in Europe in his time.  The 
sceptics prominent in this period had, Nietzsche argues, lost any conception of 
independence of decision, of a sense of pleasure in willing (p. 137).  Regaining this 
requires the development of new qualities.  ‘It seems to me more and more’, he 
muses, ‘that the philosopher, being necessarily a man of tomorrow and the day after 
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tomorrow, has always found himself and had to find himself in contradiction to his 
today: his enemy has always been the ideal of today’ (p. 143).  This is a task for the 
very few – for those who have been bred for philosophy by virtue of their origin, their 
ancestors (p. 145).  It is not something that can be taught, but rather must be known 
from experience. 
The scholar, by contrast, is subservient, lacking in self-sufficiency and 
unauthoritative.  Scholars, knowing their place among the rank and file, will be 
industrious but moderate in applying themselves.  They seek a good name for 
themselves and require constant affirmation of their value.  They have to overcome, 
again and again, a certain inner distrust which lies at the heart of all dependent beings 
and herd animals.  The diseases and ill breeding of an ignoble species are evident.  
The scholar is ‘full of petty envy and has very keen eyes for what is base in those 
natures to whose heights he is unable to rise’ (p. 133).  Inhibited in their own thoughts 
and actions, scholars become ‘frosty and reserved’ when in the presence of those who 
are able to ‘flow out’ more freely (p. 133).  In the end, 
 
… [w]hatever still remains in him of his ‘own person’ seems to him accidental, often capricious, 
more often disturbing: so completely has he become a passage and a reflection of forms and events 
not his own.  He finds it an effort to think about ‘himself’, and not infrequently he thinks about 
himself mistakenly; he can easily confuse himself with another, he fails to understand his own 
needs and is in this respect alone unsubtle and negligent. (p. 134) 
 
Nietzsche’s own life as a philosopher provides an interesting point of reference 
when considering his views.  Few philosophers, or writers in any other field, have 
been able to convey their ideas with greater wit and concision than Nietzsche.  
Nietzsche’s writings exhibit a sharpness in critique that has seldom been equalled.  
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They are a model of succinct, precise and penetrating prose.  Yet creating such a 
distinctive writing style did not come easily for Nietzsche.  In an especially 
memorable passage in one his letters from his university days, he observes: 
 
It will amuse you if I confess what has given me most trouble and anxiety: my German style.  The 
scales are falling from my eyes: I have lived too long in stylistic innocence.  I have woken up to the 
categorical imperative: ‘Thou shalt and must write’.  In fact I tried what I had never tried except in 
school: to write well.  And suddenly the pen was paralysed in my hand.  I could not do it, and I was 
angry. (cited in Hayman, 1980, p. 85) 
 
Writing, for Nietzsche, provided a form of relief from other stresses (e.g. the death of 
his aunt Rosalie in 1867), and letters enabled him to meet the need to converse with 
friends while enjoying the pleasures of writing.  The development of his aphoristic 
style had its roots in his early dissatisfaction with contemporary German scholarly 
prose.  Always a hard worker, Nietzsche at times stretched the limits of human 
endurance.  While writing The Birth of Tragedy (Nietzsche, 1967) he averaged only 
one night’s sleep every two nights.  Many of his health difficulties, including 
inflammation of the stomach and intestines in February 1871, were attributed directly 
to overwork (Hayman, 1980, p. 138).  In fact, his earlier encounter with 
Schopenhauer’s work had inspired him to deliberately test the power of the will by 
subjecting himself to arduous physical rituals – including one period of two weeks 
where he allowed himself no more than four hours of sleep each night (p. 73). 
In a letter to his sister on 29 November 1881, Nietzsche spoke of the difficulties he 
was having in writing: 
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I do not trust the thoughts that occur when my soul is oppressed and my intestine afflicted, and even 
what might get written when I have a headache will certainly be torn up.  On the other hand I am 
well aware of being tremendously indebted to this inconstancy in my health ... this magical feeling 
of getting better – a wonderful condition and the source of the most elevated and courageous 
perceptions ... As in the Engadin I go for walks in the hills, exultantly happy, and looking into the 
future as no one before me has dared to. (cited in Hayman, 1980, p. 236) 
 
Nietzsche spoke many times about the importance of suffering in his life, and came to 
believe that it served a purpose in this philosophical development.  He referred to his 
existence as a ‘fearful burden’, yet felt that the suffering and renunciation he 
experienced saved him.  Despite ‘furious attacks’ and ‘semi-paralysis’, he could find 
consolation in his thoughts (p. 219).  A committed teacher, Nietzsche wanted to 
integrate his pressing philosophical concerns and intense interest in the music of 
Wagner with classical philological learning.  Appointed to a professorship in 
philology at the exceptionally young age of 24, he became increasingly distant – in 
both collegial and theoretical terms – from some of his contemporaries.  The public 
lectures that formed the basis of his argument in The Birth of Tragedy were received 
with ‘fear and incomprehension’ (p. 120).  He  applied, unsuccessfully, for a position 
in philosophy at his university in Basel in the early 1870s.  Eventually ill health 
hastened his resignation from his university post, and he sought a new kind of 
intellectual life. 
At the time at which he was writing Human, All Too Human (Nietzsche, 1996), 
Nietzsche wished to live as a truly free spirit, driven by the quest for knowledge.  
Such a life, he noted, demands a total commitment, where even love of one’s fellow 
human beings will be ‘prudent and somewhat short-breathed’ (p. 134).   Free spirits, 
he says, engage themselves with this world of ‘affection and blindness’ only as far as 
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necessary for the sake of knowledge (p. 134).  Yet the rewards for the few who can 
follow this path are great: ‘no honey is sweeter than that of knowledge’ (p. 135).  
Having at an earlier stage in life entertained the notion of bringing together a group of 
like-minded people to live in a small philosophical community, Nietzsche ended up 
pursuing his ideals alone. 
His university pension was sufficient to enable him to wander throughout Europe 
during the 1880s, spending time in Switzerland, Italy and France while writing, 
walking and thinking.  Some of his best-known books – including Thus Spoke 
Zaruthustra (Nietzsche, 1976a), Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche, 1990) and On the 
Genealogy of  Morals (Nietzsche, 1989) – were produced during this period.  The 
final year before his collapse in January 1889 was one of frenetic writing activity, 
producing The Case of Wagner (Nietzsche, 1967), Twilight of the Idols (Nietzsche, 
1976b), The Antichrist (Nietzsche, 1976c), and the autobiographical Ecce Homo 
(Nietzsche, 1989).  The last decade of Nietzsche’s life was spent in the darkness of 
insanity, and he died in 1900. 
 
Performance-based research funding in New Zealand 
 
What relevance might Nietzsche’s portrait of scholars and philosophers have for 
contemporary academic life?  In a tertiary education environment governed by the 
logic of performativity, Nietzsche’s account assumes new significance.  As John 
Codd demonstrated, in universities and other educational institutions, knowledge has 
become commodified and harnessed as part of a wider struggle for international 
economic competitiveness.  This process has been reflected in a number of policy 
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developments and is clearly evident in New Zealand’s PBRF, a system designed to 
measure and reward research performance (see Codd, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006b). 
 The PBRF emerged from the work of the Tertiary Education Advisory 
Commission (TEAC), a body formed shortly after the formation of a new Labour-
Alliance government in New Zealand in 1999.  The case for performance-based 
research funding was considered in the fourth of the TEAC reports, Shaping the 
Funding Framework (TEAC, 2001), following a review of schemes elsewhere in the 
world.  The investigation undertaken by the TEAC commissioners was extended by a 
PBRF Working Group formed in July 2002.  The Working Group’s recommendations 
on the structure and implementation of performance-based research funding were 
published in a report, Investing in Excellence (PBRF Working Group, 2002).  
Together, the fourth TEAC report and the Working Group’s report provided the 
theoretical foundation on which subsequent practical developments in the PBRF have 
been laid. 
 The first assessment exercise (quality evaluation) was completed in 2003.  This 
was followed by a partial round in 2006.  The next evaluation is due to occur in 2012.  
In both 2003 and 2006, individual academics in participating tertiary education 
institutions and organisations were assessed by expert panels in disciplinary clusters 
on the basis of submitted ‘Evidence Portfolios’ (EPs), with lists of research ‘outputs’ 
and sections devoted to peer esteem and contributions to a research environment.  
Individuals were required to nominate four outputs as their best.  Up to thirty further 
outputs could be listed.  The other two sections were also to be presented in the form 
of a list using pre-defined categories.  There was minimal space for describing an 
individual research programme.  Individuals were awarded a grade from ‘R’ (where 
there was little evidence of research activity) to ‘A’ (research at a world class 
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standard).  Grades of ‘B’ and ‘C’ designated varying degrees of research achievement 
between these two extremes.  ‘A’ ratings were highly prized, with, for example, fewer 
than 3% of Education academics receiving this grade in the 2003 quality evaluation.  
Results in the EP assessment process have been coupled with research degree 
completions (Masters and doctoral) and externally generated research income in 
determining the total amount of PBRF funding for each participating institution or 
organisation.  The University of Auckland emerged as the clear overall ‘winner’ 
following the first assessment round (see Tertiary Education Commission, 2004), but 
the University of Otago claimed victory status after the partial round of 2006.  There 
has been a great deal of debate between these two institutions over the interpretation 
of the results, giving clear evidence of how important the PBRF has now become in 
establishing an academic reputation in New Zealand.  Universities and other 
institutions are now busy preparing and implementing strategies to maintain or 
improve their rankings in the next evaluation exercise. 
 
Nietzsche and the PBRF 
 
What would Nietzsche make of the PBRF?  And what would the PBRF make of him?  
The second question is perhaps easier to answer than the first.  Nietzsche, had he been 
assessed during the years of his university professorship, would probably have fared 
only moderately well, achieving perhaps, at best, a B rating.  This seems almost 
inconceivable given Nietzsche’s extraordinary influence in the second half of the 20th 
century and first few years of the new millennium.  He has become known, with Marx 
and Freud, as one of the great ‘Masters of suspicion’ and his work has provided the 
focus for hundreds of books, articles and conference papers.  Yet, while he was 
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writing the books that would later make him famous, Nietzsche achieved 
comparatively little recognition from his peers.  During his years of institutional 
employment, Nietzsche would have received only a modest score in the ‘peer esteem’ 
section of PBRF assessment exercise and his contribution to a research environment 
would have been regarded as virtually nil.  His most productive period was to come 
after he was no longer constrained by his university commitments.  Of course, much 
of this can be explained by changes in universities over the following century, and 
many other well known thinkers might also have been in danger of receiving low 
PBRF grades.  But Nietzsche’s case is instructive, for it highlights the limits of a 
system driven so heavily by short-term judgements about research ‘quality’.  The 
difference we make as researchers – our contributions to knowledge and to the lives 
of those we supervise and teach – will often not be evident for many years, and even 
then it may not be ‘measurable’ in the ways supporters of the PBRF would want it to 
be. 
 Nietzsche was one of the most profound individualists of his age.  He defied easy 
philosophical categorisation and he felt himself to be very much out of step with his 
time.  He wanted to provide a revaluation of all values; to disrupt the very foundations 
on which prevailing conceptions of morality had been based.  His critique of scholars 
was based, in considerable part, on what he saw as their tendency toward conformity 
– their inability to make the kind of bold, genuinely creative, independent intellectual 
leaps characteristic of true philosophers.  The PBRF was ostensibly designed to foster 
just these qualities, rewarding those who are creating cutting-edge knowledge, 
pushing the boundaries of understanding, challenging and testing ideas (Maharey, 
2002, p. 2; PBRF Working Group, 2002, p. 4).  Nietzsche’s philosophers should, on 
this basis, have been right at home in a PBRF environment.  And indeed, philosophy as 
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a discipline has done very well in the PBRF quality evaluation process.  (This does not 
mean philosophy as currently practised in university environments bears a strong 
resemblance to philosophy as Nietzsche conceived of it.) 
Yet, there is also something deeply conservative, deeply conformist, in the PBRF.  
All that counts in the PBRF process is that which can be measured – and measured in 
the narrow terms dictated by the language of ‘outputs’ (Codd, 2006a, 2006b; Roberts, 
2006).  Nietzsche sought knowledge and strove to create conditions conducive to this 
quest (see Nietzsche, 1996).  In the PBRF, it is performance that is being measured, or 
supposedly measured, not knowledge.  To do well in the PBRF, our work must be 
constructed or reconfigured to comply with these expectations.  It is true that the 
PBRF allows for ‘special circumstances’, but the exceptions granted in these cases 
simply confirm the rule – the general orientation of the PBRF process.  These are, 
moreover, not exceptions of a kind that allow researchers to claim their work 
constitutes a ‘revaluation of all values’ or a ‘philosophy of the future’ and thus should 
be granted special status.  The PBRF, in keeping with most nationwide evaluation 
systems (whether these are in tertiary education institutions, schools, or other working 
environments), is capable of dealing with difference in only a strictly limited way.  
Almost all full-time academics in New Zealand’s universities are subject to the PBRF.  
The PBRF is never far from institutional leaders’ minds when new research initiatives 
are developed.  The PBRF also exerts an influence, even if often only indirectly, on 
promotions and appointments.  Research committees and other administrative 
groupings with a research focus must take the PBRF into account in their 
deliberations, procedures and recommendations.  Tertiary education institutions and 
organisations that choose not to participate in the PBRF process nonetheless become 
affected by it given the funding consequences of their decisions.  The PBRF, in its 
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operation and influence, at both an individual level and institutional level, sends a 
clear message: conform or else.  The ‘or else’ here means ‘or else there will be 
consequences’.  These may not be as severe as dismissal (in the case of individuals) or 
closure (in the case of institutions), but they are significant nonetheless.  The PBRF 
plays an increasingly important role in shaping patterns of thought and action in New 
Zealand’s tertiary education institutions, and the more entrenched such patterns 
become the more difficult it is to rub against them. 
 Those responsible for implementing the PBRF process in universities and other 
participating institutions know how much hinges on the exercise and have, 
accordingly, devoted considerable time and energy to it.  Yet, in the rush to improve 
the system’s performance, other ways of viewing the research process – and the 
nature of academic work more generally – are in danger of being trampled or lost.  In 
converting the complex, often lengthy process of research into a finite list of 
measurable outputs, a certain kind of homogeneity is assured.  As thinkers such as 
Lyotard (1984) have recognised, information, if it is to be traded and exchanged, 
requires a certain standardisation.  The PBRF Working Group (2002) claimed that 
what was needed in New Zealand was the development of lively, vital, active research 
cultures where research productivity and interaction between ‘clever, creative 
individuals’ could be enhanced (p. 8).  The PBRF, it was argued, should be guided by 
principles of comprehensiveness, respect for academic traditions, consistency, 
continuity, differentiation, credibility, efficiency, transparency, complementarity, and 
cultural inclusiveness (pp. 8-9).  Around the same time, the official introductory web 
page on the PBRF noted: ‘The fund should also allow more standardised and 
transparent information on research outputs to be collected and made available to 
users’ (Ministry of Education, 2002). 
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Such standardisation has its drawbacks and is in tension with the claims about 
creativity in the Working Group’s report.  The very features that make a particular 
form of creative or intellectual activity distinctive and meaningful can be lost in this 
process.  For research is not simply about producing standardised outputs for ‘users’.  
Some of the most important research that goes on in institutions like universities does 
not produce anything with an immediate and tangible use value.  Researchers, in some 
fields at least, need time to reflect, to ponder, to search and explore, to read and 
reflect, to try out ideas, and to talk and interact with others (colleagues, students, 
practitioners) who share similar interests and seek to address similar questions.  While 
Nietzsche was, for a good part of his life, a rather lonely figure, in many other senses 
he exhibited exactly the qualities just noted.  He did much of his best work, his best 
thinking, while wandering in the hills of Europe.  Sometimes this form of intellectual 
activity is called ‘basic’ research or, rather derisively, ‘blue skies’ research, but 
neither of these labels is particularly helpful.  Work of this kind is ‘basic’ only in the 
sense that it constitutes the creative heart of the research process; it is not basic in the 
sense of being simple or rudimentary.  Neither does this sort of work involve a vacant, 
sleepy gazing at blue skies.  Nietzsche was, it might be said, literally a ‘blue skies’ 
researcher, but the form of intellectual work he undertook during his long walks was 
purposeful and active.  What makes this dimension of research ‘difficult’, perhaps 
irrelevant, in PBRF terms is its immeasurability, its incompatibility with a system that 
seeks to produce output units for others to ‘purchase’, ‘use’ and exploit for economic 
gain (Codd, 2005a; Roberts, 2007). 
In what general direction does the PBRF process move?  Arguably it creates a 
research environment conducive to the development of many of the negative qualities 
Nietzsche saw in scholars.  Our attention becomes focused more on what is near at 
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hand, on the details necessary for PBRF compliance, rather than on the ‘bigger 
picture’.  We quibble over the forms or the institutional demands or the weightings of 
different PBRF components or the interpretation of the quality evaluation results, 
forgetting to consider what the system as a whole is doing to our understanding of 
research and of ourselves.  The low self-esteem of which Nietzsche spoke has 
emerged as a key theme following the first two quality evaluation rounds (cf. 
Ashcroft, 2005; Clark, 2005; Smith & Jesson, 2006), with a decline in morale among 
many designated as ‘research inactive’ or worthy only of a ‘C’ when they considered 
themselves to be experienced and accomplished researchers.  At the same time, it 
must be acknowledged that for some the results have provided a boost in confidence 
(see Middleton, 2005).  A desire for recognition by others has certainly become a 
feature of the PBRF process, as individuals seek promotion and appointment partly on 
the basis of their rankings (where these are favourable) and institutions compete 
vigorously with each other to achieve results attractive to prospective research 
students, academic appointees and external funding bodies.  Living ‘unwisely’, as 
Nietzsche believed philosophers should, and refusing to conform with PBRF 
demands, is seldom an option.  Loyalty to institutional leaders in completing the 
PBRF requirements has become a necessity if academics wish to retain their positions 
and continue to earn a living from their intellectual labours. 
Nietzsche’s work is helpful in providing a lens through which to consider recent 
developments in tertiary education and research policy in New Zealand.  Yet, it is not 
without its weaknesses and it also raises further questions.  The lines between ‘mere 
scholarship’ and genuine philosophical activity – as Nietzsche saw them – remain 
somewhat ambiguous.  It is not clear where Nietzsche’s philosophers are, or have 
been.  Who are the philosophers of the future?  Should we see Nietzsche himself as 
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one?  Certainly he must be seen as a strong candidate for this title.  But who else 
might we place on the list?  Should we look toward thinkers whose work has been 
influential in the twentieth century?  (In addition to Nietzsche himself, we might name 
Marx, Freud, Weber, and Heidegger, among many others, as examples.)  Or would we 
be closer to the mark in identifying political figures who have changed the course of 
history over the last 100 years or more (e.g., Lenin, Mao, Mandela)  What of spiritual 
leaders and social activists such as Mahatma Gandhi, Simone Weil, Martin Luther 
King, Mother Teresa, and the current Dalai Lama, to name but a few?  No one named 
here seems to quite match Nietzsche’s characterisation of the new philosopher.  In 
some cases, there is a lack of the ‘hardness’ of character Nietzsche appeared to regard 
as essential; in others, there is perhaps not the degree of boldness and creativity in 
thought Nietzsche envisaged as necessary.  It is difficult, however, to know who else 
might be considered.  And if the philosophers of the future are yet to emerge, how 
might we, as beings so deeply immersed in a performance-driven, conformist, 
consumerist, anti-philosophical age, know how to identify them?  Nietzsche’s  
philosophers will have to tell us, or show us – but will we hear? 
For many thinkers past and present, the role of the philosopher has been defined by 
a commitment to a particular mode of life.  Some see this as reflective, inquiring or 
questioning in orientation; others speak of rigour and scholarship as important; yet 
others stress the need for a dynamic integration of theory with practice via critical 
transformative activity.  Lyotard (1984, p. xxv) maintains that philosophers, unlike 
‘experts’, are never certain of what they know.  Derrida (1994, p. 3) speaks of the 
philosopher as someone ‘for whom philosophy is not given’ – a person who questions 
the nature, purpose and direction of philosophy.  These points are worth keeping in 
mind when reflecting on Nietzsche’s account of scholars and philosophers and the 
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relevance of his ideas for an understanding of the PBRF.  Nietzsche exhibited the 
critical, questioning attitude to which Derrida, Lyotard and many others have referred, 
but he too must be questioned.  His disparaging remarks on women should not be 
ignored, nor should his more general tendency towards a certain kind of intellectual 
cruelty – a willingness to, as he puts it, ‘wield the knife’ while saying ‘Thus it shall 
be’ (see Nietzsche, 1990).  Nietzsche’s work must also be contextualised.  Nietzsche 
was writing at a different time, in a distant place, and under circumstances that appear 
to bear little relationship to our own in 21st century New Zealand. 
That said, there is merit in allowing Nietzsche to serve as a prompt for attempting, 
as far as this is possible, to ‘stand back’ a little from the PBRF.  It is hard to know 
what Nietzsche, were he to find himself in the present world, would have to say.  It 
seems likely that he would find the systems, policies, practices, and language of 
universities in our current age bizarre, but whether his reaction would be one of horror 
or amusement (or both) is a matter for some speculation.  Yet, while a great deal has 
changed, some of the traits – those human, all too human flaws – he identified in his 
own day are still with us today.  They simply take a different form in response to new 
social conditions.  What is clear, I think, is that leading the kind of philosophical 
existence Nietzsche carved out for himself following his resignation from his 
university post would be extraordinarily difficult (Roberts, 2001).  Taking such a leap 
of faith while still in one’s thirties, as Nietzsche did, and expecting to live this way 
into old age is simply impossible or impractical for most academics today, whether 
they are ‘scholars’ or ‘philosophers’.  From a financial point of view alone, being able 
to create a life of this kind seems highly unlikely.  Most universities do not pay 
pensions to those who leave their posts at a young age.  In New Zealand, some 
academics make superannuation contributions from their salaries but this money does 
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not become available in the form of a yearly retirement allowance until age 50.  A 
young academic committed to a post-university life of wandering, thinking and 
writing would need an alternative source of regular income and/or support from 
family or friends willing to cover some of the other responsibilities that must be met 
in contemporary western societies. 
Nietzsche did admit that he too had to serve as a scholar for a period (Nietzsche, 
1989, p. 282) and this is revealing, for it says something about the kind of preparation 
that is often necessary before one can engage in sophisticated critique.  Nietzsche’s 
conservative scholarly background played a significant role in providing him with the 
intellectual tools he needed to later undermine German cultural institutions.  
Extending this line of thought, we might say that scholarly life can be viewed as a 
form of deliberate but potentially educative suffering, where lessons have to be 
learned the hard way, over and over again.  Nietzsche, it will be recalled from earlier 
discussion, believed certain forms of suffering were important in his intellectual 
development.  Writing, while not always easy for him, was ultimately a liberating 
process.  Indeed, it is arguably the struggle itself that makes writing and other forms 
of purposeful intellectual work liberating.  Research, at any level, is often an 
agonising process – one involving frequent inner turmoil and sometimes physical pain 
(as Nietzsche experienced) – but it would be worrying, perhaps, if it were to be 
otherwise.  If research was too easy, too neat and tidy, it would lose something of the 
risk-taking spirit Nietzsche tried to capture in his portrait of the philosopher.  Over 
time, then, a ‘scholarly apprenticeship’ can play a redemptive role, but not in the way 
we might expect.  Experience in writing and research can pave the way not for an 
easier, safer, more secure, more enjoyable intellectual existence but a gradual 
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acceptance that tensions, uncertainty and struggle will always be present.  The PBRF 
throws up many such tensions in the lives of New Zealand academics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Nietzsche used the term ‘scholar’ in a quite specific and not altogether unproblematic 
manner.  Wishing to advance his view of the philosophers of the future in bold, 
dramatic fashion, there remains more than a hint of caricature in his portrait of the 
scholars of his time.  John Codd’s exemplary qualities as a scholar stood in marked 
contrast to many of the attributes identified by Nietzsche as typical of the ‘men of 
science’ he observed in the second half of the nineteenth century.  To return to the 
quotation at the beginning of this paper, John was never one to inquire simply because 
others had ordered him to.  John was careful and methodical, it is true, and in many 
senses Nietzsche was of the same inclination (despite appearing to rail against these 
qualities).  Yet, in the model of scholarship exhibited by John Codd – and by 
Friedrich Nietzsche – there was always a quiet determination to rub against the grain 
where necessary: to question, to take up a position that may be unpopular, to 
problematise.  John displayed many of the characteristics Nietzsche admired so much: 
independence in thought, courage in his convictions, and a genuine love of 
knowledge.  John’s commitment to the ideals of the university was such that he could 
not sit back and let the neoliberal reforms of the late 20th and early 21st century pass 
without critical comment.  The PBRF, as John saw it, was an extension of neoliberal 
trends already well established in the tertiary education sector.  It was another step in 
the commodification of knowledge, it intensified competition within and between 
institutions, and it reinforced a destructive culture of performativity. 
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 My concern in this paper has not been with the ‘technical’ aspects of the PBRF 
system but with some of the philosophical questions raised by it.  There is, of course, 
no perfect approach to the funding of research.  The reports of the Tertiary Education 
Advisory Commission and PBRF Working Group were helpful in highlighting 
problems with the previous system of research funding.  The PBRF addresses some of 
those weaknesses, but also creates problems of its own.  The PBRF was promoted as a 
means for enhancing creativity, increasing the quality of research, and advancing New 
Zealand as a knowledge society and economy.  The PBRF fosters a certain kind of 
individualism: it pits one academic against another in the quest for higher ‘quality’ 
rankings.  Yet, with its standardisation, its reductive use of the language of ‘outputs’, 
its elements of compulsion, its compliance demands, and its dominant influence on 
research discourse and practices in New Zealand, the PBRF also encourages 
conformity.  The PBRF is, in many respects, completely at odds with Nietzsche’s 
intellectual ideal and his way of life.  Nonetheless, there is potential within a PBRF 
environment for research to retain something of the spirit of Nietzsche’s legacy.  By 
accepting that research in today’s world is a process of struggle, with attendant forms 
of suffering, the PBRF can be kept in proper perspective and, when it becomes the 
object of careful reflection and critique, even provide the basis for a form of 
intellectual growth. 
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